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Hebert: Article 122: The Concept of Mutuality

Louisiana Mineral Code Article 122:
The Concept of Mutuality
Larry C. Hebert '
Ottinger,Hebert& Sikes, L.L.P.
Lafayette, Louisiana

An oil and gas lease is, by its very nature and by definition, at least
judicial definition, a cooperative joint venture between the lessor and lessee
for the exploration and exploitation of oil and gas from the land.2 It is a
synallagmatic contract out of which both parties intend and contemplate
obtaining benefits. The controlling intentions ofthe parties, as manifested
in a lease, is to make the extraction of oil and gas from the premises of
mutual advantage and profit.4 Thus, the relationship between lessor and
lessee is contractual. However, as in any contract, it is not only that which
is expressly set out in the contract which governs that relationship, but there
are matters that are "implied" as well.6 As Judge (later Supreme Court
Justice) Van Devanter stated in the landmark case of Brewster v. Lanyon
Zinc Co.:

"whatever is necessary to the accomplishment of that which is
expressly contracted to be done is part and parcel of the contract,
though not specified."'
Also, an underlying principle of an oil and gas lease is that of
cooperation between the parties to that contract.8 This is based not purely
upon oil and gas law but rather general contract law. That is, covenants
implied but not explicitly spelled out in oil and gas leases reflect a broader
principle of law applicable to all contractual arrangements - the principle of
& & requires
& that
cooperation found in the law of contracts.9 This principle
parties
to a contract cooperate in order to carry out the purposes of the
&
85
agreement and is based upon the reasonable
expectations of the parties

&

7

1
Partner Ottinger, Hebert
Sikes, L.L.P., Lafayette, Louisiana
2
Frey v. Amoco Production Co., 603 So.2d 166 (La. 1992) and Henry v. Ballard
Cordell Corp., 418 So.2d 1334 (La. 1982) and the authority cited therein. See also, Harrell,
Developments in Non-Regulatory Oil Gas Law, 30 INST. on Oil Gas L. Tax'n 311
(1979).
Louisiana Civil Code Article 1908.
Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801 (8th Cir. 1905).
Louisiana Civil Code Article 1908. See Frey, 603 So.2d at 172, and Odom v. Union
Producing Co., 243 La. 48, 141 So.2d 649 (1961).
6
Louisiana Civil Code Article 2054.
id. at 809. See also McDonald v. Grande Corp., 148 So.2d 441 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1962), cert denied 244 La. 128, 150 So.2d 588 (1962).
Williams and Meyers, Oil and Gas Law, Sec. 802.1.
9
Williams and Meyers, §802.
4
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when they enter into an agreement, as well as the ethical concepts of
conduct.'o As pointed out,
the requirement of cooperation may properly be said to impose a duty
in addition to that imposed by the terms of the express promise."
This idea or concept of cooperation has generally been considered the
main basis for the imposition ofwhat are referred to as implied covenants in
contracts in general, and in oil and gas leases in particular 2
From the recognition ofthe existence of implied covenants comes the
problem of interpreting how they affect the obligations ofparties to the oil
and gas lease contract and how such obligations have served to create the
"reasonable and prudent operator" standard imposed on all leases; that is,
that the lessee must perform his obligations under the lease contract in good
faith and as a reasonably prudent operator on behalf of and for the mutual
benefit of both himself and his lessor.' 3
As stated, the basis of this reasonable and prudent operator standard
with which a lessee must comply and the recognition that implied covenants
are an integral part of any oil and gas lease is based, in most jurisdictions,
upon this concept of cooperation. Here in Louisiana, however, it is not
necessary to resort to the broad principles of common law contract and
equity law. Instead, we resort to our Civil Code, the basis for all of our
laws. The obligations of the lessor to deliver the leased premises to the
lessee, to refrain from disturbing the lessee's possession and to perform the
lease contract in good faith, all obligations of the lessor specifically set out
in Louisiana Mineral Code Article 119, are simply the reiteration of any
lessor's obligations based upon the provisions of the Civil Code.14 The
general law of leases, in our law for almost 200 years, is the basis for the
law of oil and gas leases. In Louisiana, the oil and gas lease has always
been interpreted in light of the Civil Code's provisions relating to predial
leases.' 5 In fact, Louisiana Mineral Code Article 2 specifically provides
that the provisions of the Mineral Code are "supplementary to those of the
Civil Code" and, to the extent that the Mineral Code does not expressly or
impliedly address a particular situation, resort must be had to the Civil
10

Williams and Meyers, §802.1.

11

Patterson, "Constructive Conditions in Contracts," 42 Colum. L. Rev. 903.

12
However, some authorities suggest that the principle of cooperation may be an
ill-founded basis for imposing the prudent operator standard upon lessees. See discussion
infra.
13

Louisiana Mineral Code Article 122.

14

Louisiana Civil Code Articles 2475 and 2692.

15 Davis v. Lassiter, 242 La. 735, 138 So.2d 558 (1962); Williams v. Humble Oil &
Refining Co., 290 F.Supp. 408 (E.D. La. 1968), affirmed 432 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970),
rehearing denied, 435 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 934 (1971). See also,
Frey, supra at 172.
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Code. "

In the same vein, the obligations of the mineral lessee found in
Article 122, wherein the lessee is obligated to perform the contract in good
faith and to develop and operate the property as a reasonable and prudent
operator for the mutual benefit of himself and his lessor, are likewise based
on provisions ofthe Civil Code that provide that any lessee must enjoy the
thing leased as a "good administrator".' 7 That is the basis in Louisiana for
the implied obligations imposed upon the lessee, to act as the proverbial
"reasonable and prudent operator". In fact, as the late noted and well
respected Judge Rubin stated in Williams v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.

[v]iewed in this light, [i.e. that of the "good administrator" standard
established in the Civil Code] the lessee's duty to act as a good
administrator is not a separate and distinct obligation imposed in
addition to the implied obligations announced by the Louisiana courts:
it is the basic obligation ofthe lessee and all of the implied obligations
already drawn are merely elaborations or reflections of it."
a
Professor Patrick Martin of the LSU law faculty and a noted author in
the field of oil and gas law throughout the country, suggests that the oil and
gas lease, being a contract, establishes certain covenants and/or agreements
by and between the parties and that the implied obligations imposed upon
lessee actually arise in the context ofattempting to determine whether or not
the lessee has fulfilled the covenants to which he has agreed in the
contract. 19 Therefore, it has been argued that the implied covenants creating
the standard ofprudent operation do not arise as a matter of extending the
conscious intention ofthe lessor and lessee to cover matters not mentioned
in the agreement, but as a matter of determining the duties that should be
incident to the relation of the parties. 20
It is true that the search by any court, in dealing with questions of oil
and gas leases, and, indeed, any contract, is to determine the true intentions
ofthe parties. However, it is submitted that the "good administrator" or the
"reasonable and prudent operator" standard is probably never consciously
made a specific part of the lease contract by the parties. It is intrinsically
part and parcel of any such contract. That is, it is doubtful that the parties to
an oil and gas lease specifically intend to, say, provide that the lessee will
develop the lands in a particular manner, by drilling a certain number of
wells or, say, market production to a certain purchaser or under certain
16

Louisiana Mineral Code Article 2.

17
18

Louisiana Civil Code Article 2710.
290 F. Supp. at p. 414.

19 Martin, A ModernLook atImplied Covenantsto Explore,Develop,andMarket Under
MineralLeases, 27 Sw. Legal&Fdn. Oil Gas Inst., 177 (1976).
20
Kuntz, "Professor Merrill's Contribution to Oil and Gas Law," 25 Ok. L. Rev. 484
(1972).
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terms. In fact, they seldom address these issues; and, most printed lease
forms deal very little with the obligations ofthe parties after production is
established. Of course, this is so because in almost every such situation, the
lessee and lessor simply cannot determine, when they enter the lease, how it
should be operated in the future. However, it can hardly be said that both
parties, when entering into the contract, did not fully expect that any
operations thereunder would be pursued in such a manner as to fulfill the
expectations of the parties to the contract, i.e. for their mutual advantage.
Furthermore, it is this author's thoughts that the obligation ofthe lessee
to work not only for his own benefit but also that of his lessor, has some
basis in the jurisprudential and legislative intentions evidenced over the
years to impose greater contractual obligations on the party to the contract
who is in the better position to fulfill them. Thus, we have the vast array ofa
a
cases dealing with what are referred to as contracts ofadhesion.21 In oil and
gas matters, the nature of the oil and gas business lends itself to such
situation since the lessee is almost always in the unique position ofhaving
virtually all the knowledge and also the control regarding the matters ofthe
lease, e.g. drilling, completing, producing, marketing, developing and
exploring. This is so because of the nature of the business, i.e. geology,
contracts with oil and gas purchasers, the effects of faulting, 3-D seismic,
production rates and the like. Except in the few cases oflarge, sophisticated
landowner/lessors, it is the lessee, and (generally) only the lessee, who
knows enough about these matters to deal with them. The lessor and lessee
are not always on an equal footing. The lessor leases his land and gives the
lessee the right to retain what might be considered a disproportionate part of
the production to be obtained (e.g. 75% or 80%), in exchange for and with
the expectation that the lessee will perform under the contract in such
manner as to benefit both of them. Otherwise, the lessee, because of his
superior and unique knowledge and capabilities, could take complete
advantage of the lessor. Therefore, the reasonable and prudent operator
standard, with all that implies, has been imposed on the lessee. He is, ifyou
will, the "captain of the ship".
In fact, Professor Martin states that the law of implied covenants does
not actually arise from the intent of the parties, nor from an analogous
principle in contract law but

a

21 See, for example, Golz v.Children's Bureau ofNew
a aOrleans, Inc., 326 So.2d 865 (La.
1976) §at 869 wherein the court stated that "[b]roadly defined,
S.
a contract of adhesion is
standard contract, usually printed form, prepared by party of superior bargaining power
for adherence or rejection of the weaker party. Often in small print, these contracts
sometimes raise question as to whether or not the weaker party actually consented to the
terms. See LSA-C.C. Arts. 1766, 1811; Litvinoff, 6 Louisiana Civil Law TreatiseObligations (Book), 194, pp. 346-349 (1969)." See also the discussion concerning the
"power" of the lessee and the higher standard emenating therefrom at Footnote 27 herein
below.
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[r]ather it grows out of an attempt on the part of the courts to promote
what they perceive to be justice and fair dealing by requiring lessees to
adhere to a particular norm ofconduct, the prudent operator standard.22
Also, it should be kept in mind that the prudent operator standard is
apparently not one of merely good faith. It is an objective and not a
subjective test. That is, the lessee may be in good faith in its assessment as
to whether or not, for example, it is appropriate that a second or third well
should be drilled for the development of the leased premises but
nevertheless,if he may well lose the lease for not meeting the prudent
operator test it can properly be shown that a prudent operator would have
drilled such a well or wells, based upon an objective assessment of all
relevant facts. 23
Under these standards, it is a valid question to determine whether or
not a mineral lessee is held to a higher standard than in most other
contractual relationships, at least in connection with the cases or situations
dealing with development and further exploration. That is, good faith is the
usual test to be used in general contract law. Therefore, it would appear that
the situation regarding the prudent operator standard is, in fact, one where
courts apparently feel that lessees are in a better position to negotiate and
have more control over the relationship created by the oil and gas lease and,
consequently, will look to these matters for the enforcement of the promises
made by the lessee to the lessor and will attempt to "protect" the lessor
under these circumstances.24
It is interesting to note that Professor Martin suggests that perhaps the
test should, indeed, be one of good faith, recognizing that the prudent
operator standard was established in the very early part ofthe century when
the only motive of lessees, especially corporate lessees, was, or at least was
expected to be, profit. Thus, if a corporate lessee saw that there was an
opportunity to make profit, it was expected to go forward and, for example,
drill a well in order to make such profit for both the lessor and lessee.
Consequently, instead of the good afaith standard recognized in general
contract law, the prudent operator was held to a greater standard based upon
whether or not, despite good faith, the well should have been drilled ifthere
was a reasonable chance for profit to be made. Instead, Professor Martin
suggests that in the latter part of the century, particularly in the last twenty
or thirty years, many more factors become important, especially to
22
Martin, Sw. LegalFdn. at p. 197-198.
23
See, for example, Wier v. Grubb,228 La. 254, 82 So.2d I (1955); Carterv. Arkansas& MagnoliaPetroleum Co.,
LouisianaGas
Co., 213 La. 1028, 36 So.2d 26 (1948); Gennusov.
&
203 La. 559, 14 So.2d 495 (1943); Coyle v. NorthAmerican Oil Consolidated,201 La. 99,
So.2d 473 (1942); Caddo Oil MiningCo. v. Producer'sOil Co., 134 La. 701, 64 So. 684
(1914). See also, Williams Meyers, § 806.3.
24

9

See, Kuntz, 25 Okla. L.Rev. 484 (1972), supra.
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corporation, such as public opinion, environmental concerns, governmental
regulations, and other such matters. Thus, a corporation may or may not do
things that it might otherwise do because of such considerations and,
therefore, the test, he suggests, should be whether the lessee has acted in
good faith and had a reasonable basis for its judgment.25
Indeed, a review ofthis situation reveals that many times it may be that
a lessee might be forced to give up what it considers long-term stability
arising out of what he considers more reasonable but perhaps slower
development of a lease, for the rapid profitability expected by the lessor.
The question which arises is whether or not this may lead to waste and the
drilling of unnecessary wells, the prevention ofwhich are the hallmarks of
26
our conservation Act.26
This may be particularly relevant since oil and gas
are presumably finite resources and quick exploitation thereof may not
necessarily be the most prudent method by which to develop and produce
them.
Despite the various theories that exist concerning the basis for the
reasonable and prudent operator standard, nevertheless, there is no question
that such a standard exists and one with which a lessee must comply in
connection with its operations under an oil and gas lease. In Louisiana, that
standard is stated as part of the statutory scheme of the Louisiana Mineral
Code under Article 122 (hereinafter referred to merely as Article 122). That
article states
A mineral lessee is not under a fiduciary obligation to his lessor, but he
is bound to perform the contract in good faith and to develop and operate
the property leased as a reasonably prudent operator for the mutual benefit
of himself and his lessor. Parties may stipulate what shall constitute
reasonably prudent conduct on the part of the lessee.
The author specifically refers you to the phrase wherein the lessee is
required to operate the lease for the "mutual benefit" ofboth the lessor and
lessee. That is the portion ofArticle 122 which is the main subject of this
paper and the point upon which the author intends to focus. Much has been
written concerning the various implied obligations that have been
recognized (or imposed?) over the years by the courts, such as full
exploration and development, marketing, and the like. However, this paper
intends to concentrate and focus upon the issue of "mutuality", of which
those other obligations form only a specific and, by now, well-defined part.
Over the years, many lessors have argued that the relationship is more
in the nature of a fiduciary one (or certainly have styled pleadings and
arguments as such if not utilizing those exact words). However, no court
has gone quite so far as to agree with that contention and, in fact,
25

Martin, 27 Sw. Legal Fdn. at 205 (195).

26

La.R.S. 30:9.
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Article 122 specifically states that the lessee is not under a fiduciary
obligation to his lessor. However, the courts do seem to recognize a
"higher" standard or duty than what might exist in other contracts.
Of course, a fiduciary relationship is one where one party must put the
other party's interest primary and may even have to suffer some detriment
for the benefit ofthe other. In effect, a fiduciary is basically a person who
undertakes to act in the interest of another person. Under such
circumstances, by acting in the interest ofthe other person, he must do what
is in the best interest of such other person, even, under certain
circumstances, at his own cost. Suffice it to say that it implies the utmost of
good faith and fair dealing.27
Although speaking at the time of the fiduciary relationship, and
although we realize that the reasonable and prudent operator standard
prevails in Louisiana and that there is no such fiduciary relationship
between a lessor and lessee, nevertheless, the underlying basis or reason for
our current rule may have been said best by Professor Scott in his address to
the California Bar Association in 1949:
Whenever the owner of an interest in oil and gas has a power with
respect to another person's interest in oil and gas, the courts are quick
to imply a duty in connection with the exercise of such power. Power
begets responsibilities and duties. A fiduciary principle becomes
applicable. The person having the power is restricted in his conduct;
he is not permitted to base his conduct exclusively on self-interest. He
must give consideration to the effect of his conduct upon the interest
owned by another with regard to which he has a power.28
Having recognized the general basis for the reasonable and prudent
operator standard imposed on lessees and that the oil and gas lessee has
imposed on him certain implied obligations; we will now discuss the effect
of these on lessees both in general as well as in certain specific situations.
There have developed over the years several well recognized
obligations which are binding on the lessee, even though not spelled out in
the lease. These are the implied obligations of reasonable development,
further exploration, protection against drainage, diligence in marketing and
restoration of surface. 29 In fact, these have been so well recognized that
they are specifically enumerated and discussed in the official Comment to
27
H. Williams, The FiduciaryPrinciplein the Law of Oil and Gas, 13 S.W. Legal
Foundation Oil and Gas Institute, 201 (1962). See also, Kaplan v. Fine,643 So.2d 438 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1994) and Office ofthe CommissionerofInsurancev. HartfordFireInsurance
Company,623 So.2d 37 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993), writ denied, 635 So.2d 1131 (1994) for a
discussion regarding the meaning of a fiduciary.
28
H. Williams, The FiduciaryPrinciplein the Law of Oil andGas, 13 Sw. Legal Fdn.
Oil Gas Inst., 201 at 374 (1962).
29

See the official Comment under Louisiana Mineral Code Article 122.
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Article 122 in the Mineral Code and are the subject of numerous articles
and commentaries. 30 These are not, except perhaps by reference, the main
thrust of this paper. You are referred to the various excellent articles
written on them for specific discussions on these various topics. It is this
author's experience that, apparently since these are so well known, many
lessees or at least landmen feel that these are the only implied obligations
imposed on a lessee. It is also this author's experience that many lessees
are familiar with the phrase "reasonable and prudent operator" and are
perhaps of the opinion that fulfillment of aforementioned specific and
recognized obligations, without more, satisfies the reasonable and prudent
operator test. That is not so and it is because ofthat thinking that the author
has included such a detailed discussion above about the history of this
matter and the development ofand reason for the standard and the basis for
the imposition of the obligation placed on lessee to be a "good
administrator". Recognizing the reason for a rule often allows one to
understand and determine its applicability to various situations. It appears,
at least to this author, that many lessees look at this "list" as an exclusive
one and as defining what a reasonable and prudent operator is. Instead,
however, a lessee should look to the general rule or obligation and view
these specific, enumerated ones as merely illustrative examples thereof.
The cases and commentaries dealing with these matters should be reviewed
critically for discussions about the reasonable and prudent operator standard
in order to determine how a court will apply that standard to the situation at
hand.
The essence of the rule is that a lessee must conduct all of its
operations in connection with the lease, for the mutual benefit of both
himself and his lessee - the key words in this sentence being "all
operations" and "mutual benefit".

It is not only in development,

exploration, marketing and the like that a lessee must consider the position
ofthe lessor; rather, it is in the entirety of his operations. It seems that often
lessees decide on a particular course ofaction based solely, or almost solely,
on self-serving considerations - examples are unitization, additional drilling
(both to-prevent drainage and in development, and exploration), marketing,
and the like - and only after having made these decisions, and even after
beginning the implementation thereof, do they consider the effect this will
have on the lease in question and their lessors in particular. This may be
akin to "shutting the gate after the horses are out". Granted, in most cases,
the interest of the lessor and the lessee will coincide; but not always, as will
be shown in more detail below. The point of this and if this paper can
make any lasting impression is that the considerations as to the effect on
the lease and the lessor's interest should be dealt with before and not after
30 See William & Meyers, supra §§ 801, et seq. and matters cited therein. See also,
Willey, The Lessee's Implied Obligationsunderthe Mineral Code, 23 L.S.U. Inst. on Min.
Law 155 (1976).
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these decisions are made and action taken. Remember, the test is an
objective one - that is, even if the lessee is in perfect good faith still, ifthe
action taken is found not to be in the best interest ofboth the lessee and the
lessor, or at least it is found to be for the lessee's benefit at the expense of
the lessor, the reasonable
and prudent operator standard may not be met and
a
the lease may be
it placed in jeopardy. This isif the idea this author is trying to
convey in the title of this paper by use of the term "mutuality". A lessee
simply cannot make decisions with impunity they are made in a vacuum,
so to speak, and without a factor in such decision-making process being the
effect it will have on the lessor's interest.
Having now recognized that there is a standard set by which a lessee
must conduct himself and having reviewed the basis and reason for the rule,
we now turn to the more difficult issue ofjust what is meant by insuring
compliance with that standard as it applies to "mutuality". First, all courts
dealing with these matters make it clear they will determine such
is case basis in light of all ofthe
compliance or non-compliance on a case by
circumstances at hand." Obviously, there can be no hard and fast rule
because of the nature of the obligation. That is, for example, a court
determining, say, whether an operator has sufficiently explored the leased
premises must necessarily review how many wells have been drilled,
whether the wells on or off the leased premises, what horizons have been
explored, etc. No two situations dealing with these matters are alike so it
obvious why each separate situation must be reviewed individually.
Unfortunately, perhaps, this may allow a court to feel more free to decide
on the basis of "gut feeling" rather than on more technical definitions and
pre-set conduct with which a lessee may be more familiar. Therefore,
becomes even more important to the lessee's position that he not only insure
such compliance but also insure the clear appearance thereof.
These matters can perhaps best be discussed and clarified by using
few examples. In some of the instances discussed, there may not be a clear
answer, but you should see, from the examples, what the concerns are and
why more thought should be given by lessees to the "good administrator"
standard and the effect these standards may have on any action a lessee may
take in connection with a lease. It may also shed some light on how we, as
attorneys, should advise clients and try cases dealing with these matters.
We will start with a situation that was the subject of a very recent
decision by the Second Circuit Court ofAppeals, Mattie Connell Caskey,
31
See, Broussardv. NorthcottExplorationCo., Inc., 481 So.2d 125 (La. 1986). In fact,
the test for the prudent operator standard is generally, "whatever in the circumstanceswould
be reasonably expected of operators of ordinary prudence, having regard to the interest of
both Lessor and Lessee". See, Brown, The Law ofOil & Gas Leases, § 16.02. Caddo Oil &
Mining Co. v. Producers Oil Co.; Coyle v. North American Oil Consolidated,supra at
footnote 22.

-37Published by LSU Law Digital Commons, 1996
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et alv. Kelley Oil Company,et al.32 In that case, the plaintiffs owned a tract
ofland covered by an oil, gas and mineral lease granted in 1972. Kelley Oil
Company ("Kelley") was not the operator but owned an undivided interest
in that lease. There were several wells producing on the surface of the
leased premises (the "Connell Tract"), which wells were accessed by a
locked gate on the north boundary of the tract and
(if an unimproved road.
Kelley also apparently owned a lease on a tract situated to the south of the
Connell Tract. The lease form at issue was a Bath's aForm Louisiana
Spec. 14-BR1-2A-PX (10/65) which contains a provision in the granting
clause thereof that is common in many leases and which effectively stated
that the lessee could use the leased premises in connection with its
operations on the leased premises "oron any adjacentlands". Despite the
language in the lease, for some six years, Kelley apparently asked
permission from the owners of the Connell Tract for use of the surface to
build a road to gain access to the tract to the south for the drilling of a well
thereon. Such permission was denied but, nevertheless, the gate was torn
down, trees felled, ditches improved and a shale surface was laid on the
previously unimproved road which was extended to the drillsite location onin
the tract to the south of the Connell Tract. It was not clear who did this but
Kelley began using the road for access to its drillsite on the tract located
south of the Connell Tract. The owners of the Connell Tract filed suit
against Kelley to enjoin it from entering the tract "solely" for access to an
adjoining tract and for damages. At the hearing on the injunction, Kelley's
defense was that the lease on the Connell Tract specifically granted the
lessee the right to use the surface of the leased premises to construct roads
in connection with mineral operations on "adjacent lands". The District
Court upheld Kelley's right to do this and denied the injunction. However,
on appeal, that decision was reversed. In its decision, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals referred specifically to Article 122 and emphasized the
portion thereof concerning the requirement that the lessee develop the
leased premises "for the mutual benefit of himself and his lessor" and,
fact, elevated that duty or obligation of "mutuality" perhaps a notch higher
than it had been taken before when it stated that
[t]he duty of mutual benefit under R.S. 31:122 is matter of public
policy governing the burden that real rights may impose on the property.
The duty may be contractually defined, but not abrogated.
The court noted that the term "adjacent lands" did not express a clear
and unambiguous intent of the parties "to define mutual benefit as it relates
to the use of [the] leased premises as access, and nothing more, to adjacent
lands" and found "that it was incumbent upon Kelley to demonstrate, by
preponderance of the evidence, what benefit
any) accrued to the
Connells from Kelley's use of the surface for no other purpose than as
32

La. App., Second Cir., Docket No. 30278; Feb., 1998.
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road to the Crichton tract."
Thus, we see that the obligation of the lessee to operate the lease as a
"good administrator" and for the "mutual benefit" of both himself and his
lessor, has now become a matter ofpublic policy. Of course, if a particular
matter is considered public policy, mere contracts between parties cannot
abrogate it.33
From a close reading ofthe court's decision, it is fairly obvious that the
court was not impressed with the manner in which Kelley dealt with its
lessors and this case stands not only for the proposition cited above, but also
for the fact that, as is often the case, "bad facts make bad law". 34 However,
it also indicates the manner in which these types of cases should be tried,
perhaps in anticipation of a court imposing certain unanticipated
requirements ofproof. It appears crucial to the decision that Kelley failed
to put on evidence regarding any positive effect its operations may have had
on the Connell Tract. Kelley apparently relied solely or almost solely on
the language ofthe lease wherein it was specifically granted the right to use
the surface ofthe Connell Tract in connection with operations on "adjacent
lands". With all due respect, that would seem to have been enough since
the language is fairly clear, at least in this author's view. However, it mayit
now appear necessary to show not only that you have a certain right under
the lease but also how, in the exercise of that right, the lessor will be
"benefited". Also, elevating the obligation of "mutuality" to the status of
public policy presumably now means that, despite the introductory phrase
of the second sentence ofArticle 122 (to the effect that the parties are free
to determine what will constitute reasonable and prudent operations), such
an agreement between the parties will be upheld only to the extent that
does not conflict with the higher "public policy" standard of "mutual
benefit".

33

La. Mineral Code Article 3.

34
It is interesting to note that the further argument regarding the reasonableness of
Kelley's use ofthe surface was also placed at issue and the court noted that the other lessees
who were operating on the Connell Tract (i.e. the leased premises) were much less intrusive
than that of Kelley and that Kelley's operations were much more invasive, damaged more of
the property and "diminished the desirability ofthe tract for the Connells' future retirement
homes". The court further found that the testimony by the Connells showed that the
Crichton tract (i.e. the drill site tract to the south of the Connell Tract) could have been
accessed by an alternate route. Thus, the court found that Kelley failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that building the subject road across the Connell Tract, only
for access to operations on another tract of land, conferred any benefit whatsoever upon the
Connells. (The court noted, for example, that there was no showing that the road in question
would facilitate development of other wells on the Connell Tract or that the well that Kelley
drilled would be unitized with any of the leased premises.) The author questions whether the
same result would have been reached had all the lessees of the Connell Tract or, at least, the
operator,
Kelley in its operations. Presumably not, based on the language the court
used, but one cannot help but wonder.
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Obviously, there are a number of arguments that Kelley could have
made regarding the benefits of its operations that would have inured to the
owners of the Connell Tract. For example, drilling operations within the
immediate vicinity thereof could be presumed to be "beneficial" in that
drilling such a well would obviously influence or have an impact or effect
upon the tract and the development thereof; for example, by unitization of
portions of the tract with the subject well. (Of course, whether that impact
is beneficial may not be known until the well is drilled.) 35 In fact, it is
submitted that the reason that the phrase "on adjacent lands" is included in
if lease forms may well be the fact that parties recognize, particularly
printed
in light of unitization, that drilling on lands "adjacent" to or "adjoining" the
leased premises is, in a way, development ofthe leased premises. A lessee
will, it is presumed, attempt to develop a geologic "play" by drilling at whatis
he feels is the optimum location for success. Furthermore, he presumably
familiar with his obligation to prevent drainage from the leased premises
and the well were successful, would presumably unitize it with the leased
premises, and as appropriate. This could36 certainly benefit the leased
premises. Given the nature ofunitization and the fact that almost all units
include more than one tract of land, are not the odds fairly good that an
"adjacent" or "adjoining" tract will be included in the unit? Is not the hope
ofparticipation in production by unitization sufficient reason for a lessor to
include this clause in a lease?
Also, could not a well on this adjacent tract "set up" a well on the
leased premises? For example, ifthis well is drilled, even if a dry hole and
even if the leased premises were not included in the unit for the well
(something that would not be known, usually, until the well is actually
drilled), it might reveal that the optimum location for another, perhaps
better, well is on the leased premises. The list could go on but it would
appear obvious that a well on an "adjacent" tract of land could very well
benefit the leased premises.37 The beneficial effect may not be known until

if

35
This makes such obligation akin to the implied obligation of further exploration in that
the "benefit" to be realized by fulfillment of such an obligation (if any) to, for example, drill
an exploratory well will not be known until after the well is drilled. However, in such a
situation (i.e. further exploration), since the lessor would have no exposure for well costs,
the "benefit" may well be solely to the lessor if the result is a dry hole. Nevertheless, since
the test is an objective one, based not on the lessee
but rather on the ubiquitous
himself
"reasonable and prudent operator", and since the lessee's interest, including the chance of
success, profit to be made, etc. must be considered in determining whether the obligation
exists, then for a court, to impose that obligation, it must find that the lessee, too, will
"benefit"; therefore, the result should not be one-sided.
36 Is the proper word here "could" or "would"? Can the lessee simply show that the
operation "could" or "might" benefit the lessor or must he show a definite, positive effect i.e.
"would"? The author suggests that the former should be sufficient, especially with the
availability ofunitization, at least in this situation.
37 For an interesting discussion concerning the words "adjoining" and "adjacent" in the
context of oil and gas leases. See Arceneaux v. Shell Oil Co., Docket No. 96-CV-753
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the well is drilled, but shouldn't the lessee be allowed to drill it especially
since the lease allows it? Could this not be similar to the famous "sale of a
hope"? If one buys the catch of a fisherman's next cast, is he not bound,
regardless of the amount of fish caught? And if so, is not this clause
similar? Further, it seems somewhat illogical that Kelley should have had
to put on evidence to prove the obvious, especially when the right to do this
is spelled out in (despite the court's finding to the contrary, what, it
submitted, is) clear language.
It is noted that this decision is now being appealed to the Louisiana
Supreme Court. Nevertheless, even if it is ultimately overturned, it should
be viewed as a definite indication of how our courts will deal with this issue
of mutuality. In any event, a lessee should, in all instances, be prepared to
show how the action, or inaction, taken by him benefits not only his own
interest but also that of his lessor.
Another situation similar to the Connell case, at least regarding the
effect of specific language in a lease not overriding the reasonable and
prudent operator standard, is that found to be the subject of Dawes v.
Hale.38 In fact, that case was cited with approval by the Second Circuit in
the Connellcase. In Dawes, the lease in question originally covered eighty
(80) acres and contained a retained acreage provision, a fairly common
clause found in many printed lease forms which provides generally that in
the case of cancellation
(3) or termination of the lease for any cause, the lessee
nonetheless has the right to retain under the terms of the lease forty (40)
acres around any then drilling or producing well. In that case, the lessee
had drilled three
wells in the extreme northwest portion of the eighty
(80) leased premises which wells, it was apparently recognized, drained
only two to three acres. The lessee released the lease as to one forty (40)
acre tract but retained the remaining forty (40) acres and relied on the
aforestated provision in the lease for his refusal to release any portion
(1997). See also, Acree v. Shell, 548 F.Supp. 1150 (M.D. La. 1982).
38 421 So.2d 1208 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982).
39 For example, paragraph 3 of a Bath Form 42 CPM New South
in Louisiana Revised Six
(6) Pooling form states, in part: "[1]n the event of the forfeiture of this lease for any cause,
except for failure to pay royalties according to the requirements of is
this lease, Lessee shall
have the right to retain around each well then producing oil, gas or other minerals or being
drilled or worked on or shut in under Paragraph 6 hereof, the number of acres fixed and
located by or in accordance with the spacing or unit or proration allowable order of any
hereof,
Regulatory Body of the State of Louisiana or of the United States under which said well
being drilled or produced, or ifsaid well is located on a pooled unit, then Lessee may retain
all of the acreage comprising said pooled unit and ifno spacing or proration allowable order
has been issued nor any pooled unit established, then Lessee shall have the right to retain
forty (40) acres surrounding each oil well then producing or being drilled or worked on, and
one hundred sixty (160) acres around each gas or gas condensate well then producing, or
being drilled or worked on or shut in under Paragraph 6
each ofsuch tracts to be
as near a square from as is practicable."
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thereof. The issue before the court, of course, was "whether the retained
acreage provision in the printed form lease should be construed to preclude
plaintiffs' claim that lessees have violated their statutory obligation to
prudently develop the leased property".40
The court reviewed the history of the "good administrator" obligation
of a lessee and stated that "[a]ny clause purporting to limit a primary
obligation of the lease should be carefully examined to determine if the
parties clearly intended such result". 4 1 Further, the court quoted the Fifth
Circuit in its upholding of Judge Rubin's decision in Williams v. Humble
Oil & Refining Company that "[i]t would require a clear and unequivocal
clause in a lease to convince the court that the lessor intended to sacrifice
that basic obligation [to act as a good administrator] owed him by his
lessee".42 The court in Dawes found that the acreage retention clause did
not reflect a "clear, unmistakable, unequivocal intent to limit" the good
administrator standard of the lessee and allowed the plaintiffs to proceed
with their action.
The significance of this case and, indeed, also, ofthe Connell case, is
to show us rather clearly that despite what may be rather clear and
seemingly unambiguous language in a lease, courts will nevertheless read
that language in the context of the "greater" obligation of operating the
lease as a "good administrator" and if the two conflict, the latter will
prevail. Therefore, in making decisions regarding lease operations, a lessee
may not simply resort to language in the lease. He must instead be
thoroughly familiar with the reasonable operator standard and the
significance of "mutuality" and insure compliance therewith.
The next situation for discussion is that concerning well costs and
particularly the payment thereof. As we all know, the lessor in an oil and
gas lease expects to receive his benefits, i.e. his share of production in the
form of royalty, "free of expenses".43 That is, in accordance with contract
and well understood industry practices, the working or cost bearing interest
owners bear all expenses in connection with operations on the land. That
issue seems to be fairly well understood and, at least in more recent years,
has not been the subject ofmuch litigation. However, there are cases which
address the situation about which this author is interested. The issue in

40
41

421 So.2d at 1210.
421 at p.1211.
42 432 F.2d at 177. Note that in 1970 when the Fifth Circuit upheld Judge Rubin's
decision in the Williams case, the court apparently felt that such an obligation could be
"sacrificed" (so long as the language doing so was "clear and unequivocal") whereas in the
Connell case, decided this year, the court stated that this was a matter of public policy, and
therefore, it could not be "abrogated" or "sacrificed", no matter how clear the language.
43 See Louisiana Mineral Code Article 80.
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I
question is that which was the subject of Shanks v. Exxon Corporation"
of gas
That case involved a situation where the lessee had acquired an oil and
& of land which was subsequently placed in J.
a unit around a
lease on a tract
well as a result of which obligations accrued for the payment ofwell costs
to the operator ofthe well. It is noted that the lessee in question was not the
operator ofthe well and that the well was not drilled on the leased premises.
Thus, the key ingredient to these situations is that of unitization and the
obligation arising therefrom for the payment of well costs. The author notes
that the applicable statute to this situation, La.R.S. 30:10, which is often
referred to as the "risk fee" statute, was amended after the filing ofthat suit
and therefore, its new provisions did not applyis to the facts thereof.
Nevertheless, the situation is worth discussing, particularly to compare it to
the situation when the lessee and operator ofthe well on the drill site tract
also the lessee ofthe leased premises in the immediate vicinity ofthe well.
In the Shanks case, Exchange Oil Gas Corporation ("Exchange") was the
lessee of the leased premises which tract was in the vicinity of the tract
upon which Exxon drilled its Tommy
Strain No. well. After the
successful completion of the well, Exxon applied to the Commissioner
Conservation for a unit which resulted in the leased premises being included
in the unit. 45 Pursuant to the authority of La.R.S. 30:10, as it read at the
time, Exxon withheld the proceeds ofproduction attributable to the leased
premises until it recouped that tract's proportionate share of well costs. 4 6
Exchange paid royalties to the plaintiffs the for some time until it made the
decision that the well would not "pay out" and elected to simply release the
lease in order to be relieved of any further responsibility in connection
therewith. Since that previously leased tract's share of well costs had not
yet been fully recouped, Exxon continued withholding such costs from the
share now owned by the plaintiffs in their capacity as unleased mineral
owners. The plaintiffs sued TXP (as successor to Exchange's interest in the
lease) for such well costs arguing that such costs were incurred during the
existence of the lease and therefore, were the responsibility of the lessee.
44 674 So.2d 473 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1996), writdenied,679 So.2d 436 (1996). See also,
Willis v. InternationalOil & Gas Corp., 541 So.2d 332 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989).
45
It is noted that the lessee did not participate in nor consent to Exxon's drilling
operations and did not participate in the unitization proceedings in any way, two significant
factors the court noted in ruling for the lessee. However, the author questions whether such
failure to participate, at least in the unitization hearing, may not itself have been a breach of
the lessee's implied obligations under the lease, i.e. to properly and fairly represent the
lessor before administrative bodies or, at least, to prevent drainage. See Breaux v. Pan
American PetroleumCorp., supra,and Williams v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., supra,and
particularly the discussion thereof in the official Comment following Article 122 in the
Louisiana Mineral Code.
46
It is noted that there was no provision for a "risk fee" in the statute at the time as
would be the case presently and therefore, the lessee would have been responsible for well
costs, but only out of production.
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Of course, TXP's defense was that it was relieved of this responsibility
prospectively from the date of the release. Exchange argued that since
Exxon could only recoup such funds by withholding production attributable
to the tract in question, the obligation arose only as production was obtained
and therefore, it had no obligation to continue paying for such well costs
after the release. The court agreed with TXP and found that the release of
the lease resulted in the discharge of any further obligations in connection
therewith, including those dealing with the subject well costs. 4 7
Again, although the author recognizes that the applicable statute has
since been amended, nevertheless, slightly different circumstances could
provide a different result. That is, it is common knowledge in the industry
that a lessee will normally put a lease block together and acquire oil, gas
and mineral leases covering a substantial area comprising what he feels is
the prospective productives area in order to pursue the development anda
exploration
of a geological idea or play. a Before he can justify the
a
expenditure ofwhat may be millions ofdollars to develop such a geologicala
idea, it is necessary for him to protect his interest by the acquisition of
leases over a large enough area to insure that, ifthe prospect is a success, he
will be the sole party (or, at least, sole lessee) to share in the production
attributable thereto. Consequently, he may acquire leases covering, say,
if for
purposes of this discussion, a contiguous thousand acres from, for example,
ten different lessors. Suppose he drills his well in the center ofthe thousand
acre block and unfortunately, the idea proves to be only marginally
successful. An analysis of the logs, pressures, production, etc. may reveal
to him that it is quite likely that the well, it even reaches payout, will not
be very profitable. Having been given the opportunity, by the acquisition
the leases, to pursue his idea and participate in the potential largesse that
successful well would create, would such a lessee who drills only the
marginal well, then be free to release, for example, all ofthe leases except
the drillsite lease, and then, once the non-drillsite tracts are included in
unit, recoup the now released tracts' share of well costs out ofproduction?
Such situation is, of course, different from the Shanks case. In this
example, unlike the situation in Shanks, the lessee and the operator are one
and the same; therefore, the lessee obviously "participated" in the drilling
operations. Thus, the obligation (by agreement) to pay well costs may have
been incurred while the lease was in effect. (However, the well was not
the complaining plaintiff lands.) Also, the unit was in effect at the time
the well was drilled, the risk fee statute would now be applicable and could
be used for determination of participation prior to drilling, even the
lessee is not the operator. What if, however, there was but one lessee, no
unit and an off-premises well was drilled and not the operator but a third
47 The court cited the case of Davis Oil Company v. SteamboatPetroleum Corporation,
583 So.2d 139 (La. 1991) as controlling authority.

-

44

-

https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/mli_proceedings/vol45/iss1/6

16

Hebert: Article 122: The Concept of Mutuality

party landowner, as an interested party, called for the unit that ultimately
included the leased premises? Could the lessee, under such circumstances,
release the lease and retain the formerly leased lands' proportionate share of
production for well costs? Would it be any different if the lessee had
released the lease prior to the calling of the hearing for unitization, or
during the pendency of the unitization proceedings? Most leases provide
that a lessee may, at any time, release the lease and be relieved of any
further obligations thereunder. It is submitted that, in the example given,
despite such a release, the operator/lessee should not be allowed to recoup
such well costs. It is admitted that that submission has not gone
unchallenged. Discussions of this issue have been had with
if various other
oil and gas attorneys in the state and many, not most, have stated that the
clear language in the lease regarding the right ofthe lessee to release it and
be relieved of further responsibility settles this issue.48 It might, but no
doubt Kelley thought that the "clear" language in its lease in the Connell
case likewise settled the issue of use of the surface of the leased premises
for operations on adjacent lands. The author is not unmindful of the fact
that, in the example, after the release, there simply is no longer a lease in
effect. Therefore, how would the landowner be paid - as a royalty owner
the amount of the royalty provided for in the prior lease, or as an unleased
owner or even some other way? 49 It is doubted that it would be as an
unleased owner because then the prior lessor/landowner would "have his
cake and eat it too", i.e. by receiving his share of the proceeds without
paying his share of the costs.so The author has simply no concrete answer
and, as yet, has not had to face the issue. The author is aware of one
situation where this occurred but none of the landowners pursued it. It
simply seems that, given the mandate ofArticle 122 and the requirement of
mutuality, it can hardly be argued that such a lessee can have the benefit of
the lease which allowed him to drill the well to test the prospect and then,
when it does not turn out as well as he expected, abandon the lessor solely
for his own gain. Perhaps the remedy ofthe landowner is one for breach of
the lease and resultant damages for failure to comply with the obligations of

in

48
See Willis, supra,p. 344 when the court stated that "the plain wording of the lease
specifically created the right to execute a release at any time".
49
In Shanks, TXP, apparently recognizing the problem, reconvened against the plaintiffs
(i.e. its prior lessors) averring that ifthe plaintiffs were successful in requiring TXP to pay
the well costs in question, then TXP was entitled to its share ofthe production, subject to the
payment of royalties to the plaintiffs under the previously existing lease. Thus, TXP
requested that if the plaintiffs- were successful, the court should declare the previous release
void and ofno effect. Quere is this "breathing new life into a dead horse"?
50 La.R.S. 30:1 OA.2. See also Willis, supraand the cases cited therein, especially at 335,
wherein the court stated that "to the extent that the Willises are co-owners ofthe minerals at
issue, and have not participated in the expenses incurred in producing those minerals, they
are not entitled to a proportionate share ofthe proceeds without paying a proportionate share
of the expenses".

-
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Article 122 but, of course, the breach (i.e. the actionable offense - the
release) does not occur until after (or, at least, simultaneously with) the
termination of the lease. As noted, the author does not have the answer to
the question and it is conceded that the language regarding releases
contained in most leases would ostensibly allow this. However, it is
submitted that the matter is not free from doubt. It is suggested that of
there
are problems with this issue. Of course, under such circumstances, the
threat of loss of the lease is not present but perhaps a suit for damages
would be available. Nevertheless, the issue is presented in order to
evidence the kind of situation which may be envisioned by the obligation
mutuality mentioned in Article 122.
Yet another issue anticipated as a concern is that dealing with
unitization. This is not specifically mentioned in the official Comment to
Article 122. However, it probably falls under the ambit ofthe obligation to
prevent drainage. In fact, in Breaux v. PanAmerican PetroleumCorp.5 it
was suggested that under certain circumstances, a lessee might be under a
duty to unitize, or at least to attempt to unitize, the leased premises with anis
off-premises well draining the tract. It is submitted that the word "might" is
probably no longer applicable in Louisiana law. Since unitization a
available to prevent the drilling of unnecessary wells,
- and to insure each
tract's just and equitable share of production, it is submitted that
representation of the lessor (and presumably himself, as well) at unitization proceeding is an obligation of the lessee. Of course, the real
dilemma is when the operator of the well is also the lessee and particularly
if the lease in question provides for a greater royalty than that affecting the
drillsite tract. The lessee then has a built-in conflict his profit increases as
the percent of participation by the leased premises decreases. In such
circumstances, a lessee must properly represent the lessor and attempt to
include as much ofthe leased premises in the unit as is productive. Given
the inexact nature ofgeology and since so much ofunitization is a matter of
interpretation, it is suggested that good records be kept to insure that the
obligation is fulfilled. This may be fairly easy to do so long as it is done
in good faith. Nevertheless, the dissatisfied lessor may have a greater
incentive to sue because of the potential conflict. True, once the
Commissioner establishes a unit, it, by definition, establishes the legal
limits of the production and any attempt to show that more of the leased
premises should have been included in the unit formed would be considered
a collateral attack on the Commissioner's order with all the problems that
entails. 52 However, if pleadings are properly drafted to limit a claim to the
51

163 So.2d 406 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).

52
Trahanv. The SuperiorOil Company, 700 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1983). See also, Savoy
v. Tidewater Oil Company, 218 F.Supp. 607 (W.D. La. 1963), affdper curium, 326 F.2d
757 (5th Cir. 1964), and Mayer v. Tidewater Oil Company, 218 F.Supp. 611 (W.D. La.
1963).
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fulfillment ofthe obligation ofthe lessee to adequately represent the lessor
at the hearing, a sufficient cause of action against the lessee should be
recognized, a result which could place the lease in jeopardy.
An example with which this author is familiar is one where the lessee
was the operator of an off premises well and there was another tract in the
vicinity ofthe well which was unleased and which, it was discovered (based
on the information obtained from the drilling of the well) should be
included in the unit, along with a portion of the leased premises. In the
negotiations between the operator and the unleased landowner, the potential
unit participation of the unleased tract in the unit was discussed. The
operator apparently told the unleased owner that he would propose a greater
participation of that owner's tract in the unit if he leased the land to the
operator and would do so by rearranging his structure map and other
evidence, all at the expense of the leased premises. 54 Of course, being a
matter ofinterpretation, the operator would presumably justify his action by
arguing that his ultimate submittal embodied his true interpretation.
Obviously, this is quite egregious and would certainly
a be a breach of the
duty to the lessor to properly protect the leased premises or to act for the
benefit ofboth lessee and lessor. Granted, the Commissioner and his staff
simply receive the testimony and independently determine the unit
configuration. Nevertheless, it is submitted that, as difficult as it may be to a
prove, such action by a lessee is in direct violation of the obligations ofis
reasonable and prudent operator and especially the portion ofthat obligation
which requires actions be taken for their "mutual" benefit, not to mention
the "good faith" requirement of Article 122. Furthermore, in viewing the
obligations of the lessee and determining whether the lessee has complied
therewith, it has been suggested that the proper method by which to view
the situation is as if the subject lease was the only lease owned by the lessee
in the area. Having been involved in unitization matters, particularly,
representing operators, the author simply wonders (and the question
posed for your consideration) whether the operator views the situation and
prepares his evidence in the same manner when he owns leases on all the
tracts within the productive area as when he owns lease on only one.
The point to be made here is simply that a lessee, particularly one who
drills an off-premises well in the vicinity of the leased premises, must be
acutely aware of his obligations to his lessor (or actually to all his lessors)
53 In Trahan, there is an excellent discussion concerning these very matters. It is
particularly noted how the court went to some lengths to distinguish situations where the rule
preventing collateral attacks on the Commissioner's orders would not bar properly plead
claims by a lessor against a lessee on the basis of the lessee's obligation to act as
reasonable and prudent operator. See, for example, footnote 27 at p. 1025.
54 The owner ofthe unleased tract and the owner of the leased premises were neighbors
and good friends and the unleased owner told the lessor about his discussions with the
lessee/operator.
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to operate for their mutual benefit and insure that he not only complies with
these obligations but also preserves evidence thereof, because of the
increased possibility of suit in light of the built-in conflict discussed
above.
Another instance closely akin to the foregoing is that of obtaining an
allowable for the production of and actually producing a well which will be
unitized. Assume, for example, a party owns leases over the entire
productive area covered by several leases for a well drilled at a legal
location on one of the leases. The operator knows that he must initiate
unitization proceedings to insure that the proper parties receive their fair
and equitable share of the production. There are several pipelines in the
area and therefore, the well can fairly quickly be placed in production. It
takes the lessee/operator some time before the actual filing of the
proceedings, to,a for example, meet with other participants in the well to
arrive at an acceptable plan for unitization, determine and identify the
interested parties he must notify, and the like. Of course, the Office of
Conservation's current rules regarding the issuance of an allowable for a
well provides that if the request therefore is made prior to the filing of an
application for hearing before the Office of Conservation, the allowable
will be on a lease basis (remember, the well is at a "legal" location, i.e.
more than 330 feet from a "property" line) and the request is made after
such filing, the allowable will be conditioned on the applicant's agreement
or obligation to distribute the funds attributable to such production on the
basis of the equities to be set by the unit ultimately created. This really
places the lessee in a difficult position. Of course,
production
commenced before the filing, all proceeds will be due the drillsite owner
(based on the rule of capture) until the effective date of the order. 6 The
non-drillsite owners, of course, will be deprived of production proceeds
they would otherwise receive. It becomes even more difficult when the
royalty due the various lessors is different for the drillsite owner and the
others. This exact situation occurred fairly recently in south Louisiana.

if

55 The author is aware that the lessee does not have a fiduciary duty to his lessor. The
court in Trahan,discussed this at length and compared the situation of the lessee's action
before the Commissioner to that of an attorney representing a client in court and, of course,
distinguished those situations. It is recognized that sometimes the interest of the lessee and
lessor at a particular hearing on unitization may vary substantially and a lessor has as much
opportunity to present evidence at such hearing as the lessee. Therefore, his interest can
presumably be adequately protected. Nevertheless, the rather extensive discussion of these
issues in the Trahancase reveals the troubling aspects a court may have with completely
barring a lessor from asserting these claims and should serve as a warning or at least a guide
of how to handle matters regarding unitization.
,
56 See La.R.S. 30:1 and La.R.S. 30:9. See also, Frost-JohnsonLumber Co. v. Salling's
Heirs, 150 LA. 756 91 So. 207 (1922); Piercev. Goldking Properties,Inc., 396 So.2d 528
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1981), writ refused 400 So.2d 904 (1981); and Desormeauxv. Inexco Oil
Company, 298 So.2d 897 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974), writ refused 302 So.2d 37 (1974).

-48https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/mli_proceedings/vol45/iss1/6

20

Hebert: Article 122: The Concept of Mutuality

The operator was being pressured from both sides. It so happened that
when all preparations for unitization were finalized, the well had not quite
been completed, or "hooked-up", and ready for production and, with an
adjacent owner threatening to initiate the unitization proceedings himself
and the operator, wanting to be the applicant and gain whatever advantage,
if any, that might have, filed the application for the hearing prior to
receiving the allowable and therefore proceeds from the date of first
production was distributed on a unit basis."
Obviously, there is substantial room for abuse in these circumstances,
just as there is in connection with the unitization matters previously
addressed. There is no hard and fast rule governing these situations except
that of the "reasonable and prudent operator". However, these matters are
addressed here to show the difficulty that may arise because of this
obligation of "mutuality". Remember that good faith may be irrelevant if,
under an objective standard, the action of the lessee is found not to be that
of a reasonable and prudent operator. Therefore, the author suggests that
the lessee/operator in this instance not only be aware ofhis obligations but
also be prepared to defend them. Probably the best solution is to simply
move forward with unitization and production activities independently and
allow "the chips to fall as they may". That would seem to be the easiest
position to defend.
What about the situation which arose in connection with the Neomar
58 This author
Resources, Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corporation?
questions

whether perhaps the lessor in that case may not have had a cause for
concern and may have been the party who should have complained. In that
case, Amoco Production Company ("Amoco") owned the leased and had
subleased the shallow rights to Neomar. Amoco and its partner, Amerada
Hess Corporation ("Amerada"), drilled a well to the deeper horizons which
resulted in a dry hole but revealed (by logs) potential production in the
shallower horizons. Although Neomar requested ofAmoco to take over the
well, Amerada apparently never responded to Amoco's notice thereof and
thereafter Amoco simply proceeded to plug the well. Neomar subsequently
drilled its own successful well to the horizon shown productive in the
Amoco well and sued Amoco and its partners for breach of contract.
57 Of course, without agreement from the drillsite owner, it is quite possible that the
lessee would be faced with the obligation to pay "double" royalties on some portion of the
production proceeds since he would owe the drillsite owner his full royalty on the entirety of
the production until the effective date ofthe unit and also to the non-drillsite owners for their
proportionate share of unit production from the date of first production. In most instances,
the operator obtains what is often referred to as an "escrow agreement" from the drillsite
owner to provide for distribution of funds on a unit basis and if the drillsite owner does not
agree, simply delays commencement of production until the unit is created, which, of course,
may entail yet additional problems.
58

648 So.2d 1066 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1994); writ denied, 651 So.2d 277 (1995).
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Neomar claimed that Amoco, et al had breached their obligation to act as
reasonable and prudent operators. Neomar's suit was dismissed on the basis
of no cause of action and no right of action. The court said that although
Amoco (and Amerada) owed a duty to act as reasonable and prudent
operators, that duty was owed, not to Neomar, their sublessee, but to the
lessor. 9 However, the question which arises is whether or not the actions of
Amoco and Amerada breached such duty to the lessor, in that case, the State
of Louisiana. The State had a productive well on its property that was
plugged. Could this, under any stretch of the imagination, be considered
action for the benefit of the lessor, or for that matter, the lessee as well?
Presumably, by turning over the well, the lessees could have at least saved
the plugging and abandoning and surface restoration costs. Thus, what may
have happened was the flip side of the Article 122 coin - the operations
may have been to the detriment of both lessor and lessee. 6 0 Does the
affirmative statement in Article 122 to act for the benefit of the lessor, or at
least, the mutual benefit of both lessor and lessee, mean that the lessee
cannot, therefore, act to the detriment of the lessor? Could the lessor have
demanded that the well be turned over to Neomar rather than be plugged
and abandoned? What ifNeomar had not drilled the subsequent, successful
well, either because of its election not to or its inability to successfully do
so, by, for example, encountering mechanical or other problems in drilling
the well to the potentially productive horizon? Surely, the lessor would
then have suffered substantially. Or perhaps more realistically, what if the
shallower, presumably productive horizon had been marginal such that the
party who drilled the well would have produced it, if for no other reason, in
order to obtain some return on his investment (since he had already drilled
the well), but could not justify the expenditure of the necessary funds to
drill a whole new well, based on the log, etc. Thus, the lessor would lose
production as to which he otherwise would have been entitled. Because the
lease is an indivisible agreement6 , it would seem that the state could have
looked to all three of the lessees as having breached the lease because of its
violation of the Article 122 obligation to act as reasonable and prudent
operators. If there were equities to be worked out between the lessees,
could it not be argued that they could not be worked out at the expense of
the lessor?
59 The court also stated that such an obligation was also owed from Neomar to Amoco,
as its sublessor, but not vice versa.
60 The author is aware of some lessees' desire to insure compliance with the plug and
abandonment and surface restoration requirements of Office of Conservation Statewide
Order No. 29-B and therefore the corresponding reluctance to turn over operations in a well
without satisfaction of adequate protection with regard thereto. However, a bond or
insurance might address that concern. There are specific statutes dealing with an operator's
limitation of liability for future restoration and the like such as the Louisiana Oilfield Site
Restoration Law found at La.R.S. 30:80.
61
Louisiana Mineral Code Article 130.
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Perhaps the author is influenced in his opinion of the case by what
seems to be the very questionable action of plugging an otherwise
productive well, but it seems that the ultimate result was wrong, or rather
that the ultimate result would have been wrong had the lessor brought the
action instead ofNeomar. In all likelihood the decision to plug the well was
made without any, or with very little, thought given to the effect it would
have on the lessor and the lease itself. It is because of situations such as
these that the author stresses the importance of the lessee keeping in mind
the necessity for "mutuality" in oil and gas leases and operations conducted,
or not conducted, thereunder.
There are several other situations which could be addressed, but time
and space prohibit the author from doing so. For example, what about
split-streaming gas production where the prices paid for the gas to different
lessees differ? There may be valid reasons for doing so by one of the
lessees but is this at the expense of the lessor and, if so, is the entire lease
placed in jeopardy? As a partner in a well as to which production is sold to
two different purchasers, a lessee should be acutely aware ofthe potential
problems this may cause. Additionally, unitizing a leased tract at the very
end of the term of the lease perhaps for reasons other than conservation
could cause a lessee problems.62 And what about a lessee's obligations
regarding the use of secondary or tertiary recovery methods, or a lessee
farming out a lease in exchange for a guaranteed overriding royalty interest
of a certain percentage of the entire production from a well regardless of
subsequent unitization? By posing the questions, the author is not
suggesting that the lessee must share with the lessor whatever profit he
makes as a result of his ownership of the lease. However, in view of the
trend in the jurisprudence toward the "higher" standard imposed on the
lessee, and particularly the language by the Louisiana Supreme Court in the
landmark case of Frey v. Amoco Production Co. 3 , wherein the court
discussed the obligation of the lessee to share in the "economic benefits"
derived from the lease (at least as to take or pay contracts and settlements).6
What the author is suggesting is that situations such as these must be
addressed very carefully.
In conclusion, it should be kept in mind that all operations under and
pursuant to a lease must be conducted for the mutual benefit of both the
62 Debetazv. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 891 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1990). See also,McDonaldv.
Grande Corp., supra at Footnote 6.
63 603 So.2d 166 (La. 1992).
64 In discussing the "sharing" obligation of the lessee in the "take-or-pay" settlements,
the Court in Frey, at p. 174, stated that "[t]he lease represents a bargained-for exchange,
with the benefits flowing directly from the leased premises to the lessee and the lessor, the
latter via royalty. An economic benefit accruing from the leased land, generated solely by
virtue of the lease, and which is not expressly negated .. . is to be shared between the lessor
and the lessee . . ."
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lessee and the lessor. The lessee does not have to suffer any detriment in
order that the lessor benefit. However, he cannot act solely for his own
benefit. It has been this author's experience that lessees often address
situations with a rather cavalier or at least casual attitude toward the effects
which certain actions may have on the interest of their lessors.
Furthermore, it should also be kept in mind that the same relationship exists
between sublessors and sublessees and therefore, so do the same
obligations. 5 Perhaps engineering and/or geological decisions may make
perfect sense from a engineering or geological perspective but may not be
sufficient, in and of themselves, to meet the objective test of a reasonable
and prudent operator. It is the duty of the attorney or the landman to be
aware ofthese obligations and insure that the decisions made by lessees are
with due consideration thereof.
The obvious trend in the jurisprudence, as evidenced above, is to place
a higher duty on the lessee because of his greater "power" in the lease
contract relationship, as we can especially see in the Frey and Connell
cases. Although the relationship is not a fiduciary one, the courts seem to
be "pushing the envelope" closer and closer to that. It is submitted that the
lessee, because of his superior and often unique knowledge of all facts in
dealing with the operations under the lease, is and will continue to be
expected to "take care" of his lessor. He will be expected to be a
"pere de famille" kind of"good administrator" cited by Judge Rubin in the
Williams case. 6 With the use of that kind of language, good operators and
& will realize that the obligations of the reasonable and prudent
lessees
operator will only increase and not decrease. The often heard axiom of"its
getting just as hard to keep production as it is to find it" is proving to be
truer in more recent times. However, the smart lessee will heed the warning
and pay closer attention to the effects of his operation on his lessors. He
may not like it, but would be foolish to ignore it.
POOO0-
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Wier v. Grubb, 228 La. 254, 82 So.2d I (1955).
66
Williams v. Humble Oil Refining Company, supra, at 414. The term "pere de
famille" is a French term whose literal translation is "father of the family", a pretty high
obligation indeed.
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